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Abstract 
In introducing Islamic banking in Malaysia, the basic strategy was to replicate the products/ 
services offered by conventional banks.  The successful implementation of such a strategy has 
meant that Malaysia today has a truly dual banking system.  Islamic banks in Malaysia not 
only have product similarity with conventional banks but share the same overall economic 
environment and a common customer base. 
 
The ability of non Muslim customers/depositors to switch between the two banking systems, 
means that deposit / financing rates have to be similar – else give rise to arbitrage flows.  
The implication is that, though Islamic banks operate on interest free principles, the 
economic environment in  a dual banking system inevitably exposes them to the problems of 
conventional banks; in particular interest rate risk.  Using monthly data over the 10 year 
period  1994 – 2003, the paper argues that, paradoxical as it may seem, Islamic banks 
operating within a dual banking system may also be subject to interest rate risk.  
 3
 Introduction 
 
In introducing Islamic Banking, the basic strategy, at least in the Malaysian case has 
been to transform the sources and applications of funds of conventional banks into 
Islamically acceptable ones.  Thus, on the source of funds side, savings and current account 
were redesigned as Al-Wadiah accounts.  (Safe custody) while term loans (on the uses side) 
as Mudarabah accounts and Musharakah financing.  Aside from term loans, which typically 
constitute a large percentage of total uses of funds, conventional banks have two other major 
categories of lending facilities, this being short-term financing or overdraft facilities and trade 
financing.  Islamic banks offer these same services through use of a number of items.  Short-
term working capital financing in the form of Murabaha (cost-plus) and trade financing 
largely thru Bai Bithaman Ajil (deferred sale).  In addition Ijarah, Kafalah and Hiwalah 
facilities of Islamic banks match leasing, Letters of Guarantee (Bank Guarantees) and the 
Fund transfer services, respectively, of conventional banks.  
 
By choosing a strategy of replicating the products of conventional banks, Islamic 
Banks (Ibs) have grown in tandem with the overall growth of the banking sector in Malaysia.  
Figures 1 (a) and (b) show the sustained growth over the 10 year period 1994 – 2003.  The 
real impetus for Islamic Banking in Malaysia came with the push by the Central Bank for all 
local conventional banks to offer Islamic Banking Windows.  With the compulsory opening 
of these SPTF1 windows, total deposit growth within the Islamic Banking System took off.  
As shown in Fig. (2), the Percentage of Deposits within Islamic Banking2 to that of Total 
Bank Deposits has been increasing substantially.  From about a tenth of one percent (0.1%) in 
                                                 
1
 SPTF – Sistem Perbankan Tanpa Faedah – Interest Free Banking System. 
2
 Islamic banking/banks is defined broadly to include the activities of Interest Free Windows of conventional 
banks. 
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January 1994, it has grown to 7.5% of  Total  Deposits in July 2003.  This constitutes a highly 
impressive average annual growth rate of 62.5%.3 
 
Thus, Malaysia today has a truly dual banking system with both conventional and 
Islamic banks operating side by side.  Though each system operates theoretically within its 
own sphere, it is inevitable that given a common macro environment, the two systems 
interact.  A very substantial conduit connects the two.  These being the very large non 
Muslim  customer base – even of the Islamic banking system.  Given Malaysia’s multi racial 
profile, non Muslim depositors/customers are indeed a very large constituency for both 
banking systems.  The ability of non Muslim  customers/depositors to switch between the two 
systems means that deposit and financing rates between the systems have to be similar.  In a 
sense, the activity of this non Muslim customer base would act to arbitrage rate differentials 
and fund flows.  The fact that the Islamic Banking system in Malaysia has moved away from 
traditional profit and loss financing like Mudarabah and Musyarakah into instruments that 
mimic conventional ones – Murabaha and Bai Bithamin Ajil (BBA) has made the interface 
between the systems  that much easier. 
 
This situation has an important implication for Islamic Banks in Malaysia.  The 
implication being that, though Islamic Banks operate on interest-free principles, the economic 
environment in a dual banking system inevitably exposes them to the problems of 
conventional banks; in particular interest rate risk.  Ironical as it may be, this paper argues 
that Islamic banks in Malaysia may be affected by interest rate movements in the 
conventional sector.  This paper is divided into four parts.  Part two below, examines interest 
risks experienced by conventional banks, explains why it matters and how conventional 
                                                 
3
 From Jan 1994 to July 2003 
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banks manage the risk.  Using empirical data, section three examines the extent of this risk on 
Islamic banks.  Section 4, looks at the alternatives available to Islamic Banks (IBs) to manage 
such risk and  concludes. 
 
Section 2 :  Rate Risk and Conventional Banking 
 
Banks,  more so than other businesses are faced with the risk-return tradeoff.  While a 
typical bank faces several types of risks, there are three key risks that stand out.  Credit risk, 
liquidity risk and interest rate risk.  Often these risks are intertwined.  For example, an 
increase in interest rates can cause an increase in (NPLs)4;  credit risks.  Similarly, rising 
interest rates can also lead to liquidity problems.  The close link between interest rate risk and 
the others were most evident in Malaysia during the East Asian Currency Crisis.  Interest rate 
risk is often the trigger for other  forms of risks. 
 
In this section, we examine  Interest Rate Risk from a conventional bank’s viewpoint.  We 
see how conventional banks can estimate the extent of their  interest exposure and manage 
them.  From a bank’s point of view,  interest rate risk can be defined broadly as the impact of 
an interest rate change on a bank’s profits, cash flows and net worth.   Since banks are 
intermediaries between depositors and borrowers and earn their income largely from the 
interest differential or spread between the two, banks are inherently exposed to interest rate 
risk.  This risk has been made worse by the fact that banks have little influence over the 
composition of their liabilities – i.e. their deposit structure.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 NPLs – Non Performing Loans. 
 6
2.1: Why Interest Rate Risk Matters? 
 
When interest rates rise – especially if the rise is consistent, banks face a number of 
problems; 
i. Cost of funds increase – since a bank would have to pay higher rates in order to attract 
new deposits. 
 
ii. In competitive environments, the bank would have to pay higher rates even on existing 
deposits (eg. savings accounts).  Failing which the bank could see outflows on the deposit 
side.  (withdrawals, non-renewals etc.). 
 
iii. The deposit profile could change; that is the proportions in current accounts could reduce 
while that of short term FDs, savings etc. could increase.  This results from depositors 
switching accounts. 
 
iv. While the bank faces higher costs on the liabilities side, its earnings from assets would 
most likely not keep pace with the rate of increase.  As a result, the bank’s income 
margin gets squeezed. 
 
v. Given the typically longer maturity structure (duration) of the asset side compared to 
liabilities, there will be a differential impact in terms of market values.  That is, the value 
of the assets would fall more than the fall in liability value.  As a result, the bank’s net 
worth gets squeezed. 
 
Thus rising interest rates impact a bank in three ways (i) a potential reduction in 
income (ii) reduction in net worth and   (iii) a potential mismatch in liquidity.  All of these 
 7
would be undesirable.  (Note:  A steady and consistent fall in interest rates would have the 
opposite effect).  We now turn to examining each of these problems and analyze how a bank 
could “manage” or hedge the risk. 
 
Managing Interest Rate Risk 
 
 
Gap Analysis or “Gapping”, is a common technique used in managing interest rate 
risk.  Gap Analysis is often used by banks in two common forms i.e. Income Gap Analysis 
and Duration Gap Analysis.   Income Gap Analysis focuses solely on the impact of an 
interest rate change on a bank’s income.  Duration Gap Analysis on the other hand analyses 
the impact of an interest rate change on a bank’s net worth. 
 
(I) Income Gap Analysis (IGA) 
 
The simplest form of an IGA is the basic gap analysis.  Here, a bank treasurer takes a 
given time horizon, for example the current year and examines the impact of interest rate 
change on current annual income/earnings.   The first step in this analysis would be to 
determine the total ringgit amounts of rate sensitive assets and rate sensitive liabilities for the 
one year horizon.    The treasurer does this by examining the bank’s current balance sheet and 
identifying which asset and liability items are rate sensitive.   Given the one year time 
horizon, each balance sheet item  that has to be repriced or interest reset within the year is 
identified.    By this logic, items like floating rate loans (assets), variable rate deposits 
(liabilities), loans maturing within the year, marketable securities maturing within the year, 
money market deposits accounts etc.,  would all be considered rate sensitive.     
 
While there are some obvious rate sensitive assets and liabilities such as those above, 
there are also some obviously non rate sensitive assets and liabilities.  Assets such as cash, 
liquidity reserves, physical assets and liabilities like share holders equity and long term 
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borrowings would fall in this category.   In between these obviously rate sensitive and non 
sensitive items are items where the treasurer may have to make a judgement call.   For 
example, medium and long term loans provided by the bank on fixed rates clearly do not 
involve a reset, yet some amount of this may be prepaid.    Similarly, current accounts pay no 
interest and are not rate sensitive, however, in rising interest rate environment switching 
could occur.    Given these realities, the treasurer would have to make an estimate of the 
likely percentage of prepayment and account switching.  Examining the bank’s past 
experience with prepayment should give the treasurer a reasonable estimate.  Once this first 
step is done (determining the total amount of rate sensitive assets and liabilities) the next two 
steps are straight forward.   The second step involves determining the gap between rate 
sensitive assets and liabilities.   With the gap estimate, the treasurer can determine the ringgit 
impact on earnings as a result of his forecast change in interest rate. 
 
Basic Gap Analysis – An Illustration 
 
Suppose a treasurer on examining his bank balance sheet identifies the following items 
as having less than one year maturity. 
   Assets 
 
• Marketable Securities   RM  60 mil. 
• Overdrafts     RM120 mil. 
• Variable rate housing loans   RM100 mil. 
• Variable rate term loans   RM120 mil. 
• Loans & Advances (fixed < 1 yr.)  RM140 mil. 
-------------- 
    Total   RM540 mil. 
  
 
 Liabilities 
 
• NCDs / NIDs    RM160 mil. 
• Short term deposits (< 1 yr.)  RM200 mil. 
• Other variable rate borrowings RM260 mil. 
-------------- 
    Total   RM620 mil. 
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In addition, to these obvious items, let us say the treasurer considers that, 3% of fixed 
rate loans (RM40 mil.) on the asset side and 6% of Fixed Deposits with greater than 1 year 
maturity (RM80 mil.) can be considered rate sensitive based on prior experience.   
Thus, 
 
Rate Sensitive Assets =   RM540 + RM40 = RM580. 
Rate Sensitive Liabilities = RM620 + RM80 = RM700. 
 
Based on these amounts, the gap is 
 
 Gap = RSA – RSL 
 Gap = RM580 – RM700 = -RM120 mil. 
 
If the treasurer expects interest rates to rise an average 5% this year ( %)5=∆i , the impact on 
the banks income/earnings for the year can be determined as follows; 
 
 ∆ Income  = Gap x ∆i 
 
 ∆ Income = -RM120 mil. x 5% 
 
   = -RM 6 mil.  
   
  
Thus, given the bank’s current situation and interest rate outlook, the bank’s earnings for the 
year will be reduced by approximately RM6mil. 
 
That changes in interest rates can set off liquidity problems for banks is well established.  The 
liquidity problems are the result of potential mismatches in cash flows as a result of rate 
hikes.  To estimate the extent of a potential mismatch in cash flows, banks use what is often 
termed, the maturity bucket approach.  The maturity bucket approach essentially builds upon 
the above ‘gap’ analysis to provide a view from the cash flow angle. 
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The Maturity Bucket Approach 
 
This approach is intended to overcome the  problem of knowing when the gap is most 
acute.   Furthermore, by being a multi-period approach and extending beyond a year, the time 
horizon restriction is overcome.   Though the underlying logic and analytical steps are the 
same, the maturity bucket approach splits the gap analysis into several interval periods.   For 
example, to determine the gaps on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
 
Illustration 
 
Suppose, a treasurer  has just determined based on a 6-month time horizon that the 
total Rate Sensitive Assets and Liabilities are RM480 and RM600 respectively.  He realizes 
that a 3% increase in average interest rates can have serious consequences on his company 
earnings. 
Gap   = RM480 – RM600 
  = -RM120 mil. 
∆ Income  = -RM120 x 3% 
  = -RM3.60 mil. 
 
While he does know what the overall impact would be, he intends to refine the analysis on a 
monthly basis to examine where the main gaps are.   Table 1, below shows the maturity 
bucket analysis based on an assumed breakdown of assets and liabilities. 
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Table 1 
 
Monthly Maturity Bucket Analysis 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Rate Sensitive 
Asset (Maturing) 
(RM Millions) 
 
40 
 
60 
 
80 
 
80 
 
100 
 
120 
 
480 
Rate Sensitive 
Liab.(Maturing) 
(RM Millions) 
 
 
100 
 
60 
 
280 
 
60 
 
60 
 
40 
 
600 
Gap 
(RM Millions) 
 
 
-60 
 
0 
 
-200 
 
+20 
 
+40 
 
+80 
 
-120 
 
The earlier basic gap analysis showed that the bank above could have a problem if interest 
rates rose.   The maturity bucket approach refines the analysis and shows exactly where the 
problem lies.    Clearly the bank’s serious problems are in the one month and three month 
periods (buckets). 
 
The negative gaps of RM60 million and RM200 million in the one and three month buckets 
imply a net outflow of funds.  Since maturing assets would mean inflows while maturing 
liabilities, outflows, months with excess liabilities have potential shortfalls.  These have to be 
met either by raising the needed funds in the interbank market or by offering rates to attract 
new deposits.  Either way funding cost increases. 
 
Duration Gap Analysis 
The impact of rate changes on a bank’s on net worth is the result of changes in the market 
values of assets and liabilities.  When interest rates change, the market values of assets and 
liabilities change.   The rate of change or sensitivity depends on the asset or liability’s 
duration.   Duration as we know is quite simply the weighted average of the maturities of the 
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asset’s (or liability’s) component cash flows.  It therefore differs from maturity.   Since 
duration is maturity adjusted for interim cash flows, the only situation when duration and 
maturity would be equal is when there are no interim cash flows, for example,  – zero coupon 
bonds.   Thus, duration and not maturity, is the correct measure of an item’s interest rate 
sensitivity.    As in the earlier case of Income Gap Analysis, the impact of interest rate change 
arises from having a non zero gap.    Duration Gap Analysis involves the following steps; 
 
(I) Determine the duration of each asset and liability item of the balance sheet on which 
an interest income is earned or paid by the bank. 
 
(II) Find the weight (proportion) of each item within its category.  For eg. weight of the 
asset item to total interest earning assets. 
 
(III) Using the result of steps (I) and (II), determine the weighted duration of assets and 
liabilities. 
 
(IV) Determine the gap – by subtracting the duration of liabilities from the duration of 
assets.5 
 
An illustration of a Duration Gap Analysis is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  Where  the  total  amount  of  interest  bearing  assets  and  liabilities  are  not  equal;  Dur. Gap = Dur.   
Assets – 





× ..LiabDur
A
L
. 
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Hedging the Interest Rate Risks 
 It is obvious from the above discussion that interest rate risk affects bank’s in several 
ways.  Because the impact can be severe, conventional banks have several techniques by 
which to manage the risk.  Most of these involve off Balance Sheet techniques using 
derivative instruments.  In an emerging market like Malaysia, banks can hedge interest rate 
risk by using derivatives such as, Interest Rate Futures (IRF) contracts, Forward Rate 
Agreements (FRAs) and Interest Rate Swaps (IRS).  In addition, on Balance Sheet techniques 
such as using Floating rate loans and adjusting durations are also used.  For purpose of our 
later discussion on rate risk management for Islamic Banks, we examine briefly each of these 
techniques. 
 
(i) Interest Rate Futures (IRFs) 
 IRFs are a highly popular means by which conventional banks manage rate risk.  They 
are particularly  useful in managing rate risks arising from Income Gaps and Maturity Bucket 
Analysis.  A worked example of how IRFs can be used for the Maturity Bucket Analysis 
discussed above, is shown in Appendix 1.    Generally, when one’s underlying exposure is 
such that rising interest rates could hurt, the hedge strategy using IRFs should be to short IRF 
contracts.  The number of contracts shorted would depend on the size of the exposure.  In 
Malaysia, the 3 month KLIBOR6 futures which is available in serial month contracts would 
be suitable for hedging short term needs while, the 3 and 5 year MGS (Malaysian 
Government Security) Bond Futures could be used for longer term maturities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The underlying asset is an interbank deposit of RM1 million, at a yield dependent on the 3 month Kuala 
Lumpur Interbank Offer rate. 
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(ii) Forward Rate Agreements (FRA) 
 Whereas IRFs are standardized and exchange traded derivatives, a FRA is a customized 
agreement between two parties.  A commonly used hedge instrument, a FRA specifies a 
target interest rate and a notional principal.  A FRA works as follows; if the actual interest 
rate prevailing at some agreed upon future date, is higher than the target interest rate, one 
party will compensate the other.  Vice-versa if the actual interest rate turns out to be lower.  
The amount compensated will equal the interest differential (between actual and target) 
multiplied by the notional principal. 
 
Thus, if our underlying exposure is such that rising interest rates could hurt, we go into a 
FRA as the party that will receive compensation if rates are higher than target rate but will 
pay if rates go lower than target.  By setting the target rate in the FRA equivalent to our 
intended cost of interest and the notional principal to the size of our exposure, a near perfect 
hedge could be established. 
 
(iii) Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) 
 An Interest Rate Swap (IRS) is an OTC7 derivative instrument used for hedging interest 
rate risks.  In an IRS, two parties agree to swap interest rates based on a predetermined 
reference rate8 and notional principal.  One party, the fixed rate payer, pays a fixed interest 
rate, for example 10% of a notional RM10 million principal.  The other party, the floating 
rate payer, pays in exchange, for example, the prevailing 3 month KLIBOR rate based on the 
same notional amount.  Since the cash flow streams are netted off, depending on whether 
short term rates have risen or fallen, one party will have to pay the other.  For example, if 
during  a  certain predetermined period, short-term rates have risen and the 3 month KLIBOR 
                                                 
7
 Over the Counter – not a exchange traded instrument. 
8
 For example, the 3 month KLIBOR in Malaysia or the LIBOR internationally 
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is at say 12.5%, the floating rate payer has to pay the 2.5% differential (12.5 – 10%) on the 
RM10 million principal to the fixed rate payer.  The opposite happens if rates fall and the 3 
month KLIBOR is below 10%. 
 
Thus, in using an IRS for hedging, we would enter an IRS agreement as the fixed rate payer if 
we want protection against rising interest rates and as the floating rate payer if we want 
protection against falling interest rates.  As with all derivative positions, the gain or loss made 
on the IRS is intended to offset the loss (or gain) made on the underlying position. 
 
On Balance Sheet Techniques 
 
In addition to the use of off Balance Sheet derivative instruments, conventional banks can 
also use on Balance Sheet techniques to manage rate risks.  The use of these on Balance 
Sheet techniques often require changes in the way one does business and as such, are less 
popular in highly competitive markets. 
 
(iv) Floating / Adjustment rate loans 
 The use of a floating or adjustable interest rate on medium and long term loans is a 
common way of reducing duration gaps and rate risk.  In pricing loans using floating rates, 
the bank essentially transfers the interest rate risk on to the customer.  Since the loan rates  
are adjustable when interest rates change, a bank’s risk is minimized.  The duration of such a 
loan is no more dependent on the maturity of the loan, but on the reset period of the interest 
rate.  For example, a 20 year housing loan provided at a floating rate of say KLIBOR + 2% 
with annual reset, would have a duration of only one year.  The switch to floating from fixed 
rate loans can therefore substantially reduce a bank’s duration gap and rate risk. 
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(v) Adjusting Asset/Liability Durations 
 
 If the size of a bank’s duration gap is a measure of its susceptibility to interest rate 
movements, then an obvious risk reduction measure would be to minimize the gap.  For 
example, in the earlier illustration, the bank had a large positive gap of 7.2 years and this 
meant substantial interest rate exposure.  The logical way to manage this would be to reduce 
the duration on the asset side and lengthen it on the liability side.  Switching to floating rate 
loans, avoiding fixed rate long term loans etc, would reduce asset duration.  Liability side 
duration could be lengthened by emphasizing longer term deposits or locking in longer term 
deposits through marketing incentives and penalizing early withdrawals. 
 
 Since both the above off Balance-Sheet techniques require a change in the way a bank 
does business and often leaves the customer disadvantaged, these techniques would be less 
usable in highly competitive markets.  Competitive pressure would automatically put a limit 
on a bank’s ability to use these methods. 
 
Section 3 : Rate Risk and Islamic Banks 
 Having examined interest rate risks and how conventional banks manage them, we now 
turn to the potential for interest rate risk for Islamic banks.  It was argued earlier that in 
Malaysia, with its dual banking system, a number of features exist that invariably link the 
Islamic banking system with the conventional one.  In particular, the existence of a large non-
muslim customer base and the use by Islamic banks of instruments that mimic conventional 
ones leads to several implications.  First, there is extensive linkage between the two systems.  
As such, arbitrage between the systems is entirely possible, especially by non muslim 
customers who have access to both banking systems.  This in turn implies that when interest 
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rates change in the conventional systems, deposit rates must change within the Islamic 
banking system.  This is inevitable since, in the absence of corresponding changes in Islamic 
bank deposit rates, rate differentials will prevail leading to easy arbitrage opportunity.  The 
possibility of such riskless arbitrage through fund flows leads to the third implication, the 
consequences of interest rate movements that apply to conventional banks, applies to Islamic 
banks too.  When the cost of funds changes to conventional banks, the cost of funds to 
Islamic Banks too must change.  While the impact of interest rate change may be indirect on 
Islamic banks, the consequences would be similar. 
 
Data & Methodology 
 In analyzing the extent of potential interest rate risk for Islamic Banks, two key 
variables; rates of return and total deposit amounts are examined.  The logic being that these 
two variables would be the first to be directly impacted by interest rate changes.  Interest rate 
and fund flow changes, move together.  In empirically examining these two variables for both 
the Islamic and conventional banking sectors, aggregate monthly data sourced from Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) is used.  The period of study  covers a total of 113 months from 
January 1994 to July 20039.  A total of four variables, two each for each sector is examined. 
 
 The four variables are, the 3 month deposit rate of return and total deposits for the 
Islamic banking sector and the equivalent, 3 month rate of interest paid for fixed deposits in 
Conventional banks and total deposits.  The reported interest/return data is averaged across 
players in each sector while the deposit amounts are monthly total across all accounts10.  A 
strong relationship across both pair of variables would imply that Islamic banks have the 
potential for interest rate risks. 
                                                 
9
 A total of 113 months – data for 2 months Nov,  Dec. 1996 were not available.  
10
 Includes, savings, current and term deposits. 
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 Consequently, two hypotheses are tested the first that, there is no link between 3 month 
interest rates and the  3 month Islamic bank rate of return.  The second,  that there is no link 
in deposit formation.  I.e., that there is no link between the total deposits of the two banking 
systems.  In analyzing the extent of these linkages, two statistical techniques are used.  First, 
the use of Pearson Correlation and second, OLS Regression.  Two regression models were 
used with and without lag.  The models were specified as; 
)........(....................33
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where, 
MIBROR3 ; is the average indicative rate of return offered by the Islamic Banking sector for 
3 month deposits. 
 
;3 MCBINT  is the interest rate paid on 3 month fixed deposits. (where t – 1, is the  one 
period lagged variable). 
 
In examining the linkage between total deposits in the two systems. 
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To see if a causal relationship might exist, the Granger Causality (with 4 lags) is used to test 
for  causality both ways.  Eyeballing the data and data plots showed two distinct time 
segments within the overall 113 month period.  A first segment of steadily rising interest rates 
from Jan. 94 – Aug. 98 followed by a second segment from Sept. 98 – July 03, of steadily 
falling rates (see Fig. 3).  Consequently, the same analysis described above was carried out on 
the two segments. 
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Results 
 
Figures 1(a) and (b) plot the growth of total deposits within the Islamic and conventional 
systems respectively.  Notice the steady growth in deposits for both systems over the 10 year 
period.  Following slow growth from 1994 to mid 1998, total deposits within the Islamic 
banking system takes off  rapidly.  As mentioned earlier, this had to do with the push by the 
Central Bank for Islamic windows in all commercial banks/finance houses.  Confirming the 
faster growth of Islamic deposits, Fig. 2 shows the increase in percentage to total banking 
system deposits.  From virtual absence in 1994, Islamic deposits account for approximately 
8%, 10 years later.  This growth however has been more volatile (Figure 4) relative to growth 
in conventional deposits.  This perhaps being a reflection of its much smaller size.  Table 2 
below provides some descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 
Total Deposits:  Islamic Vs. Conventional 
(Jan. 1994 – Jul. 2003) 
 
Total Deposits Conventional Islamic 
Mean (RM mils) 396,285 14,656 
Annual % Growth 1.06% 7.22% 
Std. Dev. (Growth) 0.91 9.67 
Avrg. % Islamic / Conv. 
 
 
3.70% 
 
 
Results for the test of our first hypotheses that there is no relationship between the rates of 
return in Islamic banking and conventional interest rates are shown in Table 3 in Appendix.  
Panels A, B and C, show the results of the Pearson correlation coefficient, the OLS regression 
and the Granger causality tests.  These results confirm the marked co-movement in rates seen 
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in Figure 3.  Recall that based on Figure 3, the overall period was segmented into the First 
Segment (rising rates) and the Second – falling rates. 
 
 The Pearson correlation coefficients are all above 90% and are highest for the later 
period (segment two).  It also shows the closeness in movement between the two rates, 
regardless of whether it is a rising or falling interest rate environment.  The regression results 
in Panel B, confirm this.  The hypotheses that there is no relationship between conventional 
interest rates and Islamic rates of return would be rejected.  The test that βeta = 0, is rejected 
even at a 1% level of significance.  The results are consistent across all time periods.  Finally, 
the test for a causal relationship shows interesting results (Panel C).   Notice that there is a 
significant  unidirectional relationship.  It appears that changes in conventional bank interest 
rates Granger Cause changes in Islamic bank rates of return. 
 
 Results of our second hypothesis that there is no relationship between the total deposits 
in the two banking sectors is shown in Table 4 (Appendix).  Once again we see similar 
results.  There is very strong correlation between total deposits and the regression model 
again rejects the hypotheses.  The Granger causality test again shows one way causality.  
Changes in total deposits of conventional banks Granger Cause changes in deposits in the 
Islamic banking system. 
 
These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Haron, S & Ahmad, N (2000), who 
provide evidence of a relationship between the amount of deposits placed in the Islamic 
banking system in Malaysia and returns given to these deposits.  They argue that the negative 
relationship they find between the interest rate of conventional banks and the amount 
deposited in interest-free deposit facilities, is evidence of Islamic bank depositors being 
 21
guided by the profit motive.  They also argue that, this also proves the existence of the utility 
maximization theory among Muslim customers. 
 
Section 4: Evaluation & Conclusion  
 The key implication of our results is that though Islamic Banks operate within an 
interest free framework their cost of funds and inflows (deposits) are closely correlated with 
that of the conventional system.  In a sense these results are statistical proof of the earlier 
argument that with equal customer access to both systems, arbitrage flows should keep rates 
in line.  If interest rate risk resulting from changing interest rates are an omni present risk for 
conventional banks, it follows that if the cost of funds for Islamic banks are equally changing, 
then they must face similar risk.  Paradoxical as it may seem, Islamic banks operating within 
a dual banking system may also be subject to interest rate risk. 
 
 An evaluation of the balance sheet for potential asset and liability side impact, points 
to higher risk to Islamic banks relative to conventional ones.  This is largely due to the fact 
that unlike unconventional banks that typically price medium and long term loans on floating 
rates, Islamic banks do not have the flexibility to raise rates on outstanding loans when their 
cost of funds on the deposit side increase.  Our results imply that when interest rates rise, 
individual Islamic banks will be forced to raise their deposit rates or face potentially serious 
liquidity problems.  This inability to raise rates on the asset side even with rising cost of 
funds implies that the potential squeeze on income and net worth may be greater for Islamic 
banks relative to conventional ones.  Going by this argument, the impact of falling interest 
rates would be more favorable to Islamic banks than conventional ones. 
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If Islamic banks share the same consequence of rate risk as conventional ones, what can they 
do to protect themselves?  It is obvious that they cannot use the derivatives based off Balance 
Sheet techniques, so commonly used by conventional banks.  The alternative would therefore 
be on Balance Sheet adjustments.  Even here, they cannot automatically reprice loans the way 
conventional banks do with floating interest rates.  Given the five alternatives for 
conventional  banks that we examined in Section 2 earlier, only  the last one, reducing the 
maturity of loans on the asset side might be available for Islamic banks.  However, such a 
strategy of only emphasizing short-term loans has consequences inimical to the development 
of Islamic banking in general. 
 
Two alternative For Islamic Banks 
 There are however at least two ways by which Islamic banks can  minimize potential 
rate risk.  The first, would be to move away from “fixed rate” instruments like Murabaha and 
BBA (Bai Bithamin Ajil) and into profit and loss sharing ones.  Though the former financing 
methods lock-in a predetermined rate of return Islamic banks, they would also be most 
susceptible to value – loss when rates rise.  Customer financing under profit – loss sharing 
modes on the other hand would be detached from rate movements, being dependent on 
profit/loss from the financed business.  A second possible way by which Islamic banks can 
minimize potential rate risk would be by introducing a risk-sharing agreement with their 
customers.  Under this arrangement, customers of long maturity loans agree to partially 
compensate the bank if average deposit rates go beyond a predetermined level.  In return, the 
bank agrees to reduce the mark-up  on outstanding balance if its cost of funds go below 
predetermined levels11.   While this proposal appears  to push, at  least partially, the rate risk 
                                                 
11
 Such a risk-sharing arrangement is practiced in international trade where the rate used to settle/make 
payments depend on how far spot exchange rates have moved from predetermined expected exchange rates. 
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on to the customer, it does have the benefit of being shariah compliant, in that there are no 
predetermined fixed rates to both parties. 
 
 In conclusion, one might ask, why, if interest rate risk is so evident have Malaysian 
Islamic banks not been affected thus far?  There are several reasons why it has not been a 
problem thus far.  The first is that until recently, Islamic banking was a small specialized 
niche.  Furthermore, this small niche has for the most part been a monopoly and later a 
duopoly.  The absence of competition has meant that the banks have had even larger spreads 
than their conventional counterparts.  Given limited choices and religious preference, most 
customers have been willing to put up with “halal premiums”.  Given large spreads, potential 
income squeeze can be easily absorbed.  Finally, the interest rate environment has also been 
favourable.  With the exception of sharp increases in rates during the period of the 1997/98 
currency crisis, interest rates in Malaysia (and elsewhere) have been falling steadily the last 
several years.  Falling rates are obviously favourable to banks.  Today, interest rates in the 
US and elsewhere are at 45 year lows.  Over the next few years rates are likely to move 
upwards.  With a more competitive environment and a secular rise in interest rates, Islamic 
banks in Malaysia are poised for a major challenge. 
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Table 3  
 
Panel A   Correlation between 3-Month Rate of Return in IB and 3 Month Interest Rate 
 
 Overall  
 
First Segment  Second Segment  
   
IB-3MTH-ROR 
 
IB-3MTH-ROR 
 
IB-3MTH-ROR 
 
CB-3-MTH-INTR 
 
0.921440738932  
 
0.959127464741 
 
0.97406915888 
 
 
 
Panel B   Regression results of Hypothesis (1) 
 
 Period covered Coefficient          
(β) 
Probability  Value R-Squared  Remark  
 Overall 
 (Eq. 1)   
0.660683 
 
0.0000 0.849053 
 
Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
Overall  
With lag variable 
 (Eq. 2) 
0.6806059 
 
2.43125656E-5 0.8957719 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
  
 
   
First Segment  
(Eq. 1) 
 
0.739860 0.0000 0.919925 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
 
With lag variable 
(Eq. 2) 
0.749074 0.0000 0.922381 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
 
 
    
Second Segment 
(Eq. 1) 
 
1.367733 0.0000 0.948811 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
With lag variable  
(Eq.2) 
1.235162 0.0000 0.965823 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
 
 Overall is for the period: January, 1994 to July 2003. 
 First Segment is for the period January 1994 to August 1998.  
 Second Segment is for the period September 1998 to July 2003.   
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Result of Granger Causality Test of Hypothesis 1(4 lags)  
 
Overall  
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBMTHROR does not Granger Cause CBMTHINTR 
 
105 
 
0.82517246 
 
0.5123061276 
 
CBMTHINTR does not Granger Cause IBMTHROR 
  
105 
 
21.4384451 
 
1.168395362e-12* 
   
 
 
First Segment     
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBMTHROR does not Granger Cause CBMTHINTR 
 
46 
 
1.79154 
 
0.15129 
 
CBMTHINTR does not Granger Cause IBMTHROR 
 
46 
 
1.64540 
 
0.18353 
  
 
  
Second Segment     
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBMTHROR does not Granger Cause CBMTHINTR 
55 1.12352 0.35709 
 
CBMTHINTR does not Granger Cause IBMTHROR 
55 5.89485 0.00065* 
  
* Significant at 1%.  
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Table 4 
 
Panel A Correlation between Total deposit of Commercial & Islamic Banks 
 
 Overall  
 
First Segment Second Segment 
   
IB. Tot. Deposit 
 
IB-Tot. Deposit 
 
IB-Tot. Deposit  
 
CB-Tot. Deposit 
 
0.806191830717  
 
0.972959979664 
 
0.938987623641 
 
 
Panel B Regression results of Hypothesis (2); 
 
 Period covered Coefficient          
(β) 
Probability  Value R-Squared  Remark  
 Overall  
 (Eq. 3) 
0.115048 0.0000 
 
0.649945 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
With lag variable 
 (Eq. 4) 
0.115382 0.0000 0.650429 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
  
 
   
First Segment   
(Eq. 3)  
0.019135 0.0000 0.946651 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
With lag variable 
(Eq. 4) 
0.018901 0.0000 0.949130 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
  
 
   
Second Segment  0.372424 0.0000 0.881698 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
With lag variable  
(Eq. 4) 
0.378883 0.0000 0.888630 Sig. at  0.0 5% level  
 
 Overall is for the period: January, 1994 to July 2003. 
 First Segment is for the period January 1994 to August 1998.  
 Second Segment is for the period September 1998 to July 2003.  
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Panel C Result of Granger Causality Test of Hypothesis 2 (4 lags)  
 
Overall 
 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBTDEP does not Granger Cause CBTDEP 
 
105 
 
 0.84711 
 
 0.49879  
 
CBTDEP does not Granger Cause IBTDEP  
  
 105 
 
 2.90509 
 
 0.02566** 
    
First Segment     
Null Hypothesis: 
 
Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBTDEP does not Granger Cause CBTDEP 
 
  46 
 
 1.32014 
  
0.28056 
 
CBTDEP does not Granger Cause IBTDEP 
 
  46 
 
 2.64780 
 
 0.04859** 
    
Second Segment     
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
 
IBTDEP does not Granger Cause CBTDEP 
 
55 
 
0.89679 
 
0.47364 
 
CBTDEP does not Granger Cause IBTDEP 
  
1.82492 
 
0.14022 
 
** Significant at 5%.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The most obvious tool that the Treasurer of KL Finance could use to manage the gaps 
identified in the Maturity Bucket Analysis would be the KLIBOR Interest Rate Futures 
Contract.  To hedge the two negative gaps; KL Finance would have to short the futures 
contracts.  This is because, the negative gap implies that KL Finance would have to refinance 
or “borrow” amounts equivalent to RM60 million in month one and RM200 million in month 
three.   The hedge position should be one that would profit when rates increase, such that the 
treasurer is able to “lock-in” the currently prevailing rates as shown by the futures contracts.    
To fully hedge the gaps, KL Finance should; 
 
- Short 60, spot month futures contracts. 
- Short 200, 3 month futures contracts. 
 
Suppose the Treasurer observes the following quotes today; 
 
1 Month KLIBOR = 6.5% 
3 Month KLIBOR  = 7.0% 
 
Spot Month KLIBOR Futures = 93.00 
3 Month KLIBOR Futures  = 92.00  
 
By shorting 60, spot month futures contracts and 200, 3 month futures contracts, KL Finance 
Bhd. would be able to fully offset the impact of any interest rate increase, by being able to 
lock-in the current 7% (1 mth.) and 8% (3 mth.). yields of the futures contracts.   To see how 
this is possible we examine below the payoff to the hedged position at the end of one month 
and three months, (i.e. on the maturity dates) assuming a 1.5% increase in the one month rate 
and 2% increase in the three month rate. 
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Appendix 1 (contd.) 
 
Analysis of The Hedged One Month Position 
 
Since i↑ by 1.5%; the rates on maturity date would be: 
 
1 Month KLIBOR   = 8% 
Spot Month KLIBOR Futures = 92.00  
 
Result: 
 
 Profit from futures position =    (93.00 – 92.00) x 100 x 60 x [RM25 x 1/3] 
      =    RM50,000 
 
 Refinancing Cost   =    8% x 





360
30
x RM 60 mil. 
 
      =    RM400,000 
 
 Net Cost of Funds   =    RM400,000 – RM50,000 
 
      =    RM350,000 
 
 Effective Cost %   =    
000,000,60
000,350
RM
RM
 x 100 = 0.5833% 
 
 Annualized   =     0.5833 x 12 = 7.00% 
                                           
*Note:  This equals the 7.00% refinancing cost that you wanted to “lock-in” for the one 
month bucket. 
 
 
Analysis of The Hedged 3 Month Position 
 
Since i↑ by 2% over the 3 month period, the rates on maturity date would be: 
 
3 Month KLIBOR  = 9.00% 
 
3 Mth. KLIBOR Futures = 91.00 
 
 Result: 
 Profit from futures position = (92 – 91.00) x 100 x 200 ctrts x RM25 
 
      = RM500,000 
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 Appendix 1 (contd.) 
 
 Refinancing Cost   = 9% x 





360
90
x RM200 mil.  
     
      = RM4,500,000 
 
 Net Cost of Funds   = RM4,500,000 – RM500,000 
 
      = RM4,000,000 
 
 Effective Cost %   = 
.200
.4
milRM
milRM
 x 100 = 2% 
 
 Annualized   = 2% x 4 = 8% 
                      
*Note:  This is the 8% refinancing cost that you intended to “lock-in” for the 3 month 
bucket. 
 
 36
Appendix 2 
Illustration : Duration Gap Analysis 
Simplified Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Assets Liabilities 
S.T. Loans (40%) => 1.5 yrs Dur = 1 yr. C/A (40%) maturity 0 duration 0 yrs. 
  
M.T. Loans (20%) => 4 yrs Dur = 3 yrs.   S/A (20%) maturity 1.5 yrs. duration 1 yr. 
  
L.T. Loans (40%) => 25 yrs Dur = 20 yrs. F.D’s (40%) maturity 5 yrs. duration 4 yrs.  
  
Weighted Average Dur. of Assets  Weighted Average Duration of Liabilities;   
  
= .4 x 1 + .2 x 3 + 4 x 20 =  .20 x 1 + .40 x 4 
  
= 0.4 + 0.6 +8 =  1.8 yrs. 
  
= 9.0 yrs.  
  
 
 * Since Duration of Assets = 9.0 yrs. 
 
  and duration of Liabilities = 1.8 yrs. 
 
  Positive Gap   = 7.2 yrs. 
       ===== 
 
What this means is that the above bank is highly exposed to interest rate risk.  Since the 
duration of assets is 5 times that of liabilities, the fall in market value of assets as a result of 
an interest increase will be approximately 5 times more than the fall in the value of liabilities.   
 
This can be seen from the following computation; (assuming current interest rate is 10% and 
increases by 5%). 
  ∆ in Value of Assets =  % ∆P  =  -D x ( )




+
∆
i
i
1
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Appendix 2 (contd.) 
  ∆ in Value of Assets =  -9  x 





10.1
05.
=  -0.40909 
 
                 =  -40.9% 
 
    ∆ in Value of Liab. =  -1.8  x 





10.1
05.
=  -0.0818 
 
                 =  -8.18% 
   
• Thus, if interest rates increased 5% from current levels, the above bank’s asset value will 
fall 40.9% while its liabilities 8.18%. 
• (Notice that the fall in assets is 5 times the fall in liabilities –  18.89.40  =  5.0). 
•  As a result of this differential fall, the bank’s net worth will be squeezed. 
• The impact on the bank’s net worth can be determined using the following equation; 
  % ∆NW = -DGAP x ( )




+
∆
i
i
1
 
• For the bank in our above example; the reduction in net worth as a result of the 5% 
increase in interest rate will be; 
  % ∆NW = -7.2 x 





10.1
05.0
= -0.3273 
    = -32.72% 
• Clearly, the bank is highly exposed since a 5% interest rate rise will reduce Net Worth by 
approximately 33%.12 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12The Ringgit amount of this fall in Net Worth can be determined as;Tot. Assets x .33. 
